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Securities Regulation Incident To
Certificates Of Deposit And
Privately Negotiated Agreements:
Departures From A
Functionally Operative
Security Definition
Marine Bank v. Weaver, 102 S. Ct. 1220 (1982).
I. INTRODUCTION
Almost half a century has passed since Congress promulgated
the Securities Act of 19331 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934,2 which were designed to curb abuses within those financial
environments utilizing a "security."3 During that time, the ostensi-
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1976 & Supp. V 1981) [hereinafter referred to as the
Securities Act of 1933 or the 1933 Act].
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976 & Supp. V 1981) [hereinafter referred to as the
Exchange Act of 1934 or the 1934 Act].
3. The Securities Act of 1933 defines the term "security" as follows:
When used in this subchapter, unless the context otherwise
requires-
(1) The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock
bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or
participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certifi-
cate, pre-organization certificate or subscription, transferable share,
investment contract, voting trust certificate, certificate of deposit for
a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral
rights, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as
a "security", or any certificate of interest or participation in, tempo-
rary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or
right to subscribe to or purchase any of the foregoing.
15 U.S.C. § 77(b) (1) (1976). "Security" is defined in the 1934 Act as follows:
When used in this chapter unless the context otherwise
requires...
(10) The term "security" means any note, stock treasury stock,
bond, debenture, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-
sharing agreement or in any oil, gas, or other mineral royalty or
lease, any collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or
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ble anti-fraud workhorse of the the two acts has been section 10(b)
of the 1934 Act 4 and rule 1Ob-5.5 Application of these provisions
provides a federal forum 6 as well as a private cause of action,
7
which in turn has provided a fertile opportunity for prospective
plaintiffs to attempt an application of the securities laws to their
subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust
certificate, certificate of deposit, for a security, or in general, any in-
strument commonly known as a "security"; or any certificate of inter-
est or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt
for, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the forego-
ing but shall not include currency or any note, draft, bill of exchange,
or banker's acceptance, which has a maturity at the time of issuance
of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of grace, or any re-
newal thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited.
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (10) (1976). See also infra note 79.
4. Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the
mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security registered on a national securities exchange or any se-
curity not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or con-
trivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976). See generally L. Loss, SEcuarriEs REGuLATON 1421-
1519 (2d ed. 1961 & Supp. 1969) [hereinafter cited as Loss].
5. SEC rule lOb-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the
mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made in the light of circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1982). It has been noted that the securities laws were
created to provide protection "wherever there are savings accounts, wherever
people invest their funds . . . [wherever people have] suffered because of
lack of information concerning investments that have been recommended to
them." 77 CONG. Rac. 2914 (1933).
6. The 1934 Act § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976), confers upon the federal courts ex-
clusive jurisdiction over suits arising from the Act.
7. The Supreme Court has clearly established the right of individual enforce-
ment under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston,
51 U.S.L.W. 4099 (U.S. 1983); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196
(1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 729-30 (1975);
Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life and Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
See Loss, supra, note 4, at 3869-73; Wermeil, Justices Upheld Investor's Right
To Sue For Fraud Wall St. J., Jan. 25, 1983, at 4, col. 1.
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specific dilemma.8 One of the most frequently alleged bases for
federal subject matter jurisdiction under the securities laws is the
presence of a "note" transaction.9
In Marine Bank v. Weaver,'0 the United States Supreme Court
confronted the issue of whether a certificate of deposit" issued by
a federally regulated bank was to be deemed a "security" for pur-
poses of the federal securities law and anti-fraud provisions. 2 The
8. "The relative ease with which one may recover for a violation of SEC Rule
10b-5 has led prospective plaintiffs to seek redress in federal forums even
though their claims do not involve instruments which fall within the every-
day conception of securities." Comment, Commercial Notes and Definition of
"Security" Under Securities Exchange Act of 1934: A Note is a Note is a
Note?, 52 NEB. L REV., 478,478-79 (1973). Such applications have involved, for
example, noncontributory pension plan participations, the stock of a coopera-
tive housing association, franchise agreements, land sales contracts, and
whiskey warehouse receipts. See generally Sonnenschein, Federal Securities
Law Coverage of Note Transactions: The Antifraud Provisions, 35 Bus. LAw.
1567, 1567 n.1 (1980).
9. In the last several years a number of commentators have discussed this topic.
See FitzGibbon, What is a Secutity?-A Redefinition Based on Eligibility to
Participate in the Financial Markets, 64 MiN. L, REV. 893 (1980); Hannan &
Thomas, The Importance of Economic Reality and Risk in Defining Federal
Securities, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 219 (1973-74); Lipton & Katz, "Notes" Are Not Al-
ways Securities, 30 Bus. LAW. 763 (1975); Lipton & Katz, "Notes" Are (Are
Not?) Always Securities-A Review, 29 Bus. LAw. 861 (1974); Schneider, The
Elusive Definition of a Security, 14 REV. SEC. REG. 981 (1981); Sonnenschein,
supra note 8; Comment, Notes as Securities Under the Securities Act of 1933
and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 36 MD. L. REv. 223 (1976); Com-
ment, supra note 8; Note, Bank Certificates of Deposit: Notes Not in Tune with
Securities Regulation, 10 FoR)HAm URB. L.J. 469 (1982). See also Annot., 39
A.L.R. FED. 357 (1978 & Supp. 1982). For initial commentaries analyzing the
Weaver decision, see Arnold, Marine Bank v. Weaver: New Guidance On
What Is Not a Security, 53 OKLA. B.J. 2199 (1982); Pitt, "Weaver" Could Invite
New Generation of Litigation, Wash. Legal Times, Mar. 15, 1982, at 11, col. 1.
10. 102 S. Ct. 1220 (1982).
11. The federal regulations provide:
The term "time certificate of deposit" means a deposit evidenced
by a negotiable or nonnegotiable instrument which provides on its
face that the amount of such deposit is payable to bearer or to any
specified person or to his order.
(1) On a certain date, specified in the instrument, not less than
30 days after the date of deposit, or
(2) At the expiration of a certain specified time not less than 30
days after the date of the instrument, or
(3) Upon notice in writing which is actually required to be given
not less than 30 days before the repayment, or
(4) In all cases only upon presentation and surrender of the
instrument.
12 C.F.R. § 217.1(c) (1982).
12. An important aspect of the decision dealt with the question of whether a per-
sonal profit sharing agreement fell within the definition of a security. For an
analysis of this agreement by the Court, see infra notes 109-23 and accompa-
nying text.
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Weaver decision provided a conditional answer to an issue which
has been the subject of judicial dialogue for some time,13 holding
that the certificate of deposit in the present case was not a secur-
ity.14 More importantly, however, Weaver develops and redefines
the Court's previous fundamental analysis as to what is, and what
is not, a security.
The purpose of this Note is to demonstrate (1) the impact of the
Court's decision on prior judicial interpretations as to what consti-
tutes a security; (2) refinements to the Court's own basic test; and
(3) the creation of new ambiguities concerning the proper reach of
the federal securities laws.
II. THE WEAVER FACTS
In February of 1978, Sam and Alice Weaver purchased a $50,000
six-year certificate of deposit from Marine Bank.15 The note16 had
a six-year maturity, bore interest at the rate of 7.5 percent, and was
insured for up to $40,000 by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpo-
ration (FDIC).17 The Weavers then pledged the certificate back to
Marine Bank to guarantee a $65,000 loan by the bank to a wholesale
slaughterhouse and retail meat market company, Columbus Pack-
ing Company, owned by Raymond and Barbara Piccirillo.18 In con-
sideration for the loan guarantee, the Weavers entered into a
separate agreement with the Piccirillos whereby the Weavers were
to receive fifty percent of the net profits of the Piccirillos' business
13. See, e.g., Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce Trust Co. v. Fingland, 615
F.2d 465 (7th Cir. 1980); Burrus, Cootes and Burrus v. MacKethan, 537 F.2d
1262 (4th Cir. 1976), opinion withdraum and prior judgment aFd on other
grounds, 545 F.2d 1388 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 826 (1977); Bellah
v. First National Bank of Hereford, 495 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir. 1974); Superinten-
dent of Ins. v. Bankers Life and Cas. Co., 300 F. Supp. 1083 (S.D.N.Y. 1969),
affid on other grounds, 430 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 404
U.S. 6 (1972).
14. 102 S. Ct. at 1223.
15. Id. at 1222.
16. A certificate of deposit is "a note of the issuing bank which recites that an
amount of money has been deposited and will be paid by the bank to a named
person or bearer." F. BEUTEL, BANK OFFICER'S HANDBOOK OF COMMERCIAL
BANKING LAws 85 (4th ed. 1974) (emphasis added), quoted in Note, supra
note 9, at 475. But see U.C.C. § 3-104(2) (d) (1978) (the explicit definition of
"note" in the Uniform Commercial Code recognizes an instrument which
complies with certain requirements as "a 'note' if it is a promise other than a
certificate of deposit"). Id. (emphasis added).
17. 102 S. Ct. at 1222 & n.1. While the certificate of deposit could only be insured
up to $40,000 by the FDIC at the time the Weavers purchased it, the ceiling on
insured deposits has since been raised to $100,000. 12 U.S.C. § 1813(m)(1)
(1976), as amended by Act of March 31, 1980, Pub. L No. 96-221, § 308(b) (1), 94
Stat. 147 (1980).
18. 102 S. Ct. at 1222.
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and one hundred dollars per month for the duration of the guaran-
tee.19 In addition, the Weavers were given the right, at the discre-
tion of the Piccirillos, to use a barn and pasture owned by the
company as well as the right to veto future borrowing of the
business.
20
Subsequent to the transactions, the Weavers discovered that
the slaughterhouse owed the bank approximately $33,000 for prior
loans,2 ' which the Weavers contended was not disclosed to them at
the time the agreements were negotiated.22 The business eventu-
ally went bankrupt, and the bank indicated its intent to claim the
pledged certificate of deposit as security.2 3
Faced with the possibility of losing the assets they had pledged
to Marine Bank, the Weavers initiated suit against the bank, alleg-
ing, inter alia, a violation of section 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934.24 The Weavers alleged that the bank officers
had told them that the proceeds of the loan they were guarantee-
ing would be used by the slaughterhouse as working capital. In-
stead, nearly all of the money was applied to repay prior bank
loans and cover an overdrawn checking account.25 In essence, the
Weavers' complaint contained allegations that they had been de-
frauded in connection with the sale of the certificate of deposit and
the separate profit sharing agreement between the Piccirillos and
themselves. 26
The district court entered summary judgment for the bank on
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. The Weavers contended that Marine Bank was unable to collect the $33,000 of
outstanding loan payments from Columbus, and thus became actively in-
volved in persuading the Piccirillos to secure an investor for Columbus. The
Weavers further contended the bank had represented to them that, inter alia,
there was little risk to the Weavers in making the pledge, the collateral was
substantial enough to protect the bank and the Weavers, and that the bank
would provide the Weavers a monthly report so they could monitor the activi-
ties of Columbus. Brief for Respondents at 4, 7.
22. 102 S. Ct. at 1222. The certificate owners asserted that had they known of the
slaughterhouse's precarious financial condition, they would not have guaran-
teed the loan by pledging their certificate of deposit. Id.
23. Id. While the certificate had not yet been claimed by the bank at the time the
litigation commenced, the bank conceded that its other security was inade-
quate, and that it would consequently claim the pledged note.
24. Id. See supra note 4. The Weavers also pleaded pendent claims for violations
of the Pennsylvania Securities Act and for common law fraud by the bank.
25. Id. The Court noted that the bank kept approximately $42,800 to satisfy its
prior loans and Columbus' overdrawn checking account. All but $3,800 of the
remainder was disbursed to pay overdue taxes and to satisfy other creditors.
26. Id. Although Marine Bank did not specifically deny that it had solicited the
Weavers to pledge the certificate of deposit as collateral for the Piccirillo
loan, it did deny that it had any knowledge of the purchase agreement made
between the Weavers and the Piccirillos. Brief for Petitioner at 4.
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the section 10(b) claim on the basis that "if a wrong occurred, it did
not take place 'in connection with a purchase or sale of any secur-
ity,' as required for liability under §10(b)."27 The Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit reversed, holding that a finder of fact could
reasonably conclude that either the certificate of deposit or the
agreement between the Weavers and the Piccirillos was a secur-
ity.28 The Supreme Court held that neither the certificate of de-
posit nor the profit sharing agreement fell within the protections
for which the securities laws were enacted, and, accordingly, re-
versed and remanded the case to the court of appeals.
29
M. ANALYSIS
A. Judicial Definition and Treatment of Securities
1. The Supreme Court
The definitions of "security" in the 1933 and 1934 Acts30 were
drafted "in sufficiently broad and general terms so as to include
within the definition of the many types of instruments that in our
commercial world fall within the ordinary concept of a security."
31
The obvious breadth and flexibility of these provisions, coupled
with the absence of any interpretations of the definitional language
by the draftsmen, have relegated to the judicial branch an opportu-
nity to develop a set of practicable guidelines. In fact, in the last
forty years, the Supreme Court has decided on eight occasions
whether a specific instrument was a security for purposes of the
federal securities laws.3 2
27. 102 S. Ct. at 1222.
28. Id. at 1222-23 (citing Weaver v. Marine Bank, 637 F.2d 157 (3d Cir. 1980)).
29. Id. at 1223. The remand to the Court of Appeals was to determine whether
the pendent state claims should be entertained.
30. See supra note 3.
31. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1933). The acts were passed in order
"to protect the investing public and honest business. The basic policy is that
of informing the investor of the facts concerning securities to be offered for
sale in interstate and foreign commerce and providing protection against
fraud and misrepresentation." S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933).
President Roosevelt, in his 1933 message to Congress proposing securities
legislation, stated: "The proposal adds to the ancient rule of caveat emptor,
the further doctrine 'let the seller also beware."' H.R. Doc. No. 12, 73d Cong.,
1st Sess. 1 (1933). For an exhaustive study of the legislative history of the
securities acts, including the bills and enactments, see LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURrrIEs EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 (J.
Ellenberger & E. Mahar eds. 1973).
32. See Weaver, 102 S. Ct. 1220; International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S.
551 (1979); United Housing Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 858 (1975); Super-
intendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life and Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971); Tcherepnin v.
[Vol. 62:579
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Ten years after the promulgation of the 1933 Act, the Supreme
Court, in SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp.,33 issued its first opin-
ion on the interpretation of this definitional language. The Court
conferred a broad interpretation upon the statutory language in or-
der to cover all aspects of fraud for which the act was intended:
[T] he reach of the Act does not stop with the obvious and commonplace.
Novel, uncommon, or irregular devices, whatever they appear to be, are
also reached if it be proved as a matter of fact that they were widely of-
fered or dealt in under terms or courses of dealing which established their
character in commerce as 'investment contracts,' or as 'any interest or in-
strument commonly known as a "security.' 
34
Three years later, the Supreme Court attempted to develop
functional guidelines for defining a security in SEC v. W.J. Howey
Co.,35 where the Court determined that sales contracts for plots of
orchard land and contracts to service the fruit trees constituted an
investment contract for purposes of the 1934 Exchange Act.36 In
Howey, the defendant corporation publicly offered small parcels of
a citrus grove coupled with an optional contract for harvesting and
marketing the produce. All the produce was then pooled for sale,
and the promoters dispersed each purchaser's share of the net pro-
ceeds in accordance with the output from each parcel.3 7 Justice
Murphy, writing for the majority, created a test from those ele-
ments which he concluded were pertinent in determining the
existence of an investment contract: "[A]n investment contract
for purposes of this Securities Act means a contract, transaction or
scheme whereby [1] a person invests his money [2] in a common
enterprise and is led to expect profits [3] solely from the efforts of
the promoter or a third party .... ,"38 The Court's decision quickly
became known and "codified" as the three-prong Howey standard
by numerous lower courts.39 It soon became apparent, however,
Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967); SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202
(1967); SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of America, 359 U.S. 65 (1959);
SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946); SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp.,
320 U.S. 344 (1943).
33. 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
34. Id. at 351.
35. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
36. Id. at 300. In Howey, the Court was not defining the term "security" in gen-
eral, but only an investment contract. The Court has subsequently stated,
however, that it perceives no distinction between an "investment contract"
and an "instrument commonly known as a 'security"' and that the Howey
test "embodies the essential attributes that run through all of the Courts' de-
cisions defining a security." Foreman, 421 U.S. at 852.
37. 328 U.S. at 295-96.
38. Id. at 299.
39. See infra notes 56-72 and accompanying text.
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that the Howey codification contained "seeds of its own
destruction." 40
Consequently, the Court in later decisions made several efforts
at reinterpreting the three-pronged test, the most important of
which were United Housing Foundation v. Foreman4' and Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel.42 In Foreman, the
plaintiff-tenants were required to purchase shares of "stock" in a
publicly financed, low income housing project in order to lease an
apartment from the defendant housing cooperative. 43 The Court
noted that even though the interests which the tenants purchased
were called "stock," the label itself was not enough to bring the
interests within the purview of the securities laws simply by virtue
of the fact that the statutory definition included the word "stock."
44
The Court stated that "[b]ecause securities transactions are eco-
nomic in character Congress intended the application of these stat-
utes to turn on the economic realities underlying a transaction,
and not on the name appended thereto."45
The Court pointed out that from an "economic realities" stand-
point, the cooperative purchase arrangement failed the Howey test
for two essential reasons. First, the Court stated that "there can be
no doubt that investors were attracted solely by the prospect of
acquiring a place to live, and not by financial returns on their in-
vestments."4 6 Second, the Court noted that the profits hoped for
by the potential investor were not "derived from the en-
treprenurial or managerial efforts of others."47 As one commenta-
40. Hannan & Thomas, supra note 9, at 225. An example of the type of problem
that has arisen from the Howey test is the fact that it designates profits com-
ing solely from the efforts of others. A literal interpretation of this condition
would exclude an interest in any venture where the investor contributed his
own efforts. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, 474 F.2d 476, 482
(9th Cir. 1973) (holding that the word "solely" does not really mean "solely,"
and that the word should not be read as a strict or literal limitation on the
definition of an investment contract because such a literal application would
induce easy evasion by simply adding a requirement that the buyer contrib-
ute a modicum of effort). For a discussion of the "common enterprise" re-
quirement, see infra notes 114-23 and accompanying text.
41. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
42. 439 U.S. 551 (1979).
43. 421 U.S. at 842.
44. Id. at 848.
45. Id. at 849 (emphasis added). The Court reemphasized its earlier opinion that
"in searching for the meaning and scope of the word 'security' in the Acts,
form should be disregarded for substance and the emphasis should be on
economic reality." Id. (quoting Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336
(1967)).
46. Id. at 853 (emphasis added).
47. Id. at 852 (emphasis added). In commenting on the Howey decision, the ma-
jority held that the "touchstone" of the definition of a security:
is the presence of investment in a common venture premised on a
reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the en-
[Vol. 62:579
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tor has noted, while the Court's opinion in Foreman never
explicitly departed from Howey, it might be viewed as adding two
new requirements: first, that the return be '"inancial" in form; and
second, that the activities engaged in by the issuer-the activities
which put it in a position to furnish a return on the securities in-
vestment-be predominantly "entreprenurial or managerial."4 8
In International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel,49 the sec-
ond major Supreme Court case interpreting Howey, the Court de-
cided that a compulsory, noncontributory pension plan did not
constitute a "security" for purposes of the federal securities acts.50
The Court held that the "investment of money" requirement man-
dated by Howey was not satisfied because "the purported invest-
ment [was] a relatively insignificant part of an employee's total
and indivisible package .... -51 In addition, the Court found that
any expectation of profits was not derived from the efforts of
others. Indeed, any anticipated profit depended "primarily on the
employee's efforts to meet the vesting requirements, rather than
the fund's investment success."52
After marching the pension plan in Daniel through the Howey
test, the Court discussed the application of the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)53 to the situation in
Daniel:
The existence of this comprehensive legislation governing the use and
terms of employee pension plans severely undercuts all arguments for ex-
tending the Securities Acts to noncontributory, compulsory pension plans.
Congress believed that it was filling a regulatory void when it enacted ER-
ISA .... Not only is the extension of the Securities Acts by the court
trepreneurial or managerial efforts of others. By profits, the Court
has meant.., a participation in earnings resulting from the use of
investors' funds.... In such cases the investor is "attracted solely
by the prospects of a return on his investment."
Id. (citations omitted).
48. FitzGibbon, supra note 9, at 903.
49. 439 U.S. 551 (1979).
50. Daniel dealt with the issue of whether an interest in the Teamsters' Union
Pension Fund was a security. The fund was established out of contributions
made by employers of Teamsters; collective bargaining agreements required
those employers to make payments to the fund in proportion to the number
of Teamsters that they employed. 439 U.S. at 553. The plan did not permit
employees to opt out, nor did it in general contemplate their making contri-
butions themselves. Upon retirement, an eligible employee received a pen-
sion in a fixed amount determined according to a formula based on
anticipated employer contributions, anticipated performance of the invest-
ments made, and the anticipated amount of other pensions paid out. Id. at
554.
51. 439 U.S. at 560.
52. Id. at 562.
53. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
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below unsupported by the language and history of these acts, but in light
of ERISA it serves no general purpose.
5 4
It thus appears that even if the three-pronged Howey test and
the two additional elements enunciated in Foreman are satisfied,
the Court will still refuse to apply the federal securities laws
where other comprehensive governing legislation exists. As has
been recognized by at least one commentator, this principle, intro-
duced as something of an afterthought in Daniel, was to reappear
as a major precept in the Marine Bank opinion.55
2. The Lower Courts
The circuit courts have developed three basic approaches in de-
termining whether an instrument falls under the statutory defini-
tion of security, primarily because the courts have applied
modified interpretations and emphases to the Howey-Foreman-
Daniel rules. 5 6 A general examination of the three views reveals
an emphasis on different factors in the Supreme Court formula-
tions, and the necessary requirement of flexibility has sometimes
led to vague and indefinite conclusions. 57 Nevertheless, the courts
have used one of these three approaches in assessing whether spe-
cific instruments are securities.5 8
The analytical theory applied by the largest majority of circuit
courts is the commercial-investment dichotomy, followed by the
Third, Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits.59 This theory encom-
54. 439 U.S. at 569-70.
55. Arnold, supra note 9, at 2201. See infra notes 92-103 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the preemption of the securities acts by other governing
legislation.
56. See, e.g., SEC v. Diversified Indus., Inc., 465 F. Supp. 104, 108-11 (D.D.C. 1979)
("Unfortunately, the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals that have confronted this
issue have devised somewhat different tests to determine whether a note
constitutes a security ... .") Id. at 108.
57. See, e.g., Great W. Bank and Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1976) ("We
do not hold that application of any single factor discussed above compels us
to affirm the judgment of the district court. Nor do we intimate that in a dif-
ferent case there would not be other factors to consider.") Id. at 1258.
58. See infra notes 59-72 and accompanying text. For an analysis of the three
judicial approaches, see Lipman, Notes As Securities, 14 REV. SEC. REG. 933
(1981); Sonnenschein, supra note 9, at 1589-1605; Note, supra note 9, at 478-86.
59. United States v. Namer, 680 F.2d 1088 (5th Cir. 1982); First Nat'l Bank of Las
Vegas, New Mexico v. Estate of Russell, 657 F.2d 668 (5th Cir. 1981); Meason v.
Bank of Miami, 652 F.2d 542 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 939 (1982);
American Fletcher Mortgage Co. v. United States Steel Credit Corp., 635 F.2d
1247 (7th Cir. 1980); United Am. Bank of Nashville v. Gunter, 620 F.2d 1108
(5th Cir. 1980); National Bank of Commerce v. All Am. Assurance Co., 583
F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1978); McGovern Plaza Joint Venture v. First Nat'l Bank of
Denver, 562 F.2d 645 (10th Cir. 1977); Emisco Industries v. Pro's Inc., 543 F.2d
38 (7th Cir. 1976); C.N.S. Enters. v. G & G Enters., 508 F.2d 1354 (7th Cir. 1975);
Zabriskie v. Lewis, 507 F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1974); SEC v. Continental Commod-
ities Corp., 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974); McClure v. First Nat'l Bank of Lub-
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passes a process of analyzing the instrument in the context of the
underlying transaction and comparing it to the kinds of transac-
tions which the anti-fraud provisions are intended to cover. It has
been explained that under this approach, note transactions are
judged against the attributes of an "investment" and only transac-
tions that are deemed "sufficient" to display those attributes are
accorded anti-fraud coverage.60 In essence, a transaction involving
a note must be of an "investment" rather than a "commercial" na-
ture for the note to be a security.61
The second doctrine has been labeled the "risk capital" ap-
proach, followed almost exclusively by the Ninth Circuit.62 The
crux of this test is, applying Howey, based on an analysis of
whether an investor has provided "assets to the enterprise in such
a manner as to subject himself to financial loss."63 The court es-
sentially asks whether investors have contributed "risk capital"
subject to the entreprenurial or managerial efforts of others. 64 The
bock, 497 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1974); Bellah v. First Nat'l Bank of Hereford, 495
F.2d 1109 (5th Cir. 1974); Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1973);
Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 463 F.2d 1075 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1009 (1972).
60. Sonnenschien, supra note 9, at 1588.
61. Meason v. Bank of Miami, 652 F.2d 542, 548 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 939 (1982); Bellah v. First Nat'l Bank of Hereford, 495 F.2d 1109, 1113 (5th
Cir. 1974).
62. SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1980); Amfac Mortgage Corp. v. Arizona
Mall of Tempe, Inc., 583 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1978); United Cal. Bank v. THC Fin.
Corp., 557 F.2d 1351 (9th Cir. 1977); Great W. Bank and Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d
1252 (9th Cir. 1976); El Khadem v. Equity Sec. Corp., 494 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir.
1974). Although not adopting the risk capital approach to securities per se,
the Sixth Circuit has recently applied the risk capital approach in order to
determine if the "presence of an investment" condition exists for purposes of
applying the Howey test. Union Planters Nat'l Bank of Memphis v. Commer-
cial Credit Business Loans, Inc., 651 F.2d 1174 (6th Cir. 1981). See also Ameri-
can Bank and Trust Co. v. Wallace, 702 F.2d 93 (6th Cir. 1983).
63. Hecter v. Wiens, 533 F.2d 429, 432 (9th Cir. 1976).
64. Great W. Bank and Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252, 1257 (9th Cir. 1976) (constru-
ing SEC v. W.J. Howey, Inc., 328 U.S. 294 (1946)). See supra notes 47-48 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the entreprenurial/managerial ele-
ment.
The test was first enunciated by Judge Traynor in Silver Hills Country
Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961). Sobieski
involved a partnership which sought to finance a country club operation by
the sale of "memberships" which they claimed were not investments because
the memberships conveyed no rights in the assets or income of the club. The
California Commissioner of Corporations claimed the club memberships fell
within the literal definition of a "beneficial interest in title to property, profits,
or earnings." Id. at 813, 361 P.2d at 907, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 187. The court found
the promotional memberships to be within the regulatory purposes of the
California law, relying on the fact that the capital solicited to finance the ven-
ture for profit was put at risk. Id. at 815, 361 P.2d at 908, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 188.
The court noted that the objective of the "risk capital" approach was "to af-
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Ninth Circuit has specifically identified the following six factors as
material in measuring the risk involved: (1) time; (2) collateraliza-
tion; (3) form of the obligation; (4) circumstances of issuance; (5)
relationship between the amount borrowed and the size of the bor-
rower's business; and (6) the contemplated use of the funds.65
A third approach, adopted by the Second Circuit, 6 6 retreats
from the scheme of analyzing the context of the transaction or the
existence of risk in note transactions. This approach, commonly
called the "literal view,"67 espouses the theory that an instrument
is a security if it simply falls within the plain terms of the acts.68
Consequently, the party asserting that a note is not within the
anti-fraud provisions of the acts has the burden of showing that
"the context otherwise requires." 69 Judge Friendly, writing for the
Second Circuit, proffered guidance for determining whether this
burden has been met by enumerating a set of examples:
One can readily think of many cases where [the context does otherwise
require ]-the note delivered in consumer financing, the note secured by a
mortgage on a home, the short-term note secured by a lien on a small busi-
ness or some of its assets, the note evidencing a "character" loan to a bank
customer, short-term notes secured by assignment of accounts receivable,
or a note which simply formalizes an open-account debt incurred in the
ordinary course of business (particularly if, as in the case of the customer
of a broker, it is collaterilized). When a note does not bear a strong family
resemblance to these examples and has a maturity exceeding nine
months, Section 10(b) of the 1934 act should be held to apply. We realize
this approach does not afford complete certainty but it adheres more
closely to the language of the statutes and it may be somewhat easier to
apply than the weighing and balancing of recent decisions of sister
circuits. 7 0
ford those who risk their capital at least a fair chance of realizing their objec-
tives in legitimate ventures whether or not they expect a return on their
capital in one form or another." Id., 361 P.2d at 908-09, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 188-89.
65. Great W. BanA; 532 F.2d at 1257-58.
66. Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139 (2d Cir. 1982); Allegaert v. Chemical Bank,
657 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1980); Exchange Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Touche Ross &
Co., 544 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1976). See also Aldrich v. New York Stock Exch.,
446 F. Supp. 348, 356 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Commercial Discount Corp. v. Lincoln
First Commercial Corp., 445 F. Supp. 1263, 1266 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). But see,
Ayala v. Jamaica Sav. Bank FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98041 (E.D.N.Y. June
1, 1981); Tanuggi v. Grolier, Inc., 471 F. Supp. 1209 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), which de-
cline to follow the literal view.
67. See, e.g., Sonnenschein, supra note 9, at 1601. This approach was initially re-
ferred to as the "strong family resemblance" test. See, e.g., Lipman, Notes as
Securities, 11 REV. SEc. REG. 853 (1978).
68. Exchange Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1137 (2d.
Cir. 1976). See supra note 3 for the text of the definitional sections of the 1933
and 1934 Acts.
69. Exchange Nat'l Bank, 544 F.2d at 1137-38 (emphasis in original) (construing
15 U.S.C. § 77(b) (1976); 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (1976)).
70. Exchange Natl Bank, 544 F.2d at 1138.
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The "literal view" thus purports to resolve all "gray-area" cases in
favor of an affirmative determination of anti-fraud coverage,
whereby the court must evaluate the specific instrument against
examples which unquestionably do not invoke the federal securi-
ties acts.7 1 Presumably, where a party cannot prove that "the con-
text otherwise requires" vis-a-vis Judge Friendly's enumerated
examples, the anti-fraud coverage is held to apply. It appears that
with one exception, courts outside the Second Circuit have not fol-
lowed this approach.72
With this background, it is not suprising that today the status of
the law as to what actually does constitute a security is one of con-
fusion and internal contradiction. Flanked by its own Howey-Fore-
man-Daniel analysis7 3 on the one side and the various circuit court
tests74 vying for applicability on the other, the Supreme Court un-
dertook once again to determine whether a specific instrument
was a "security" as that word is defined in the federal securities
laws.
B. The Weaver Decision
1. Statutory Analysis
The Court analyzed the certificate of deposit and the purchase
agreement by initially scrutinizing the statutory framework of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934,75 once again recognizing the
breadth of the definition of the term "security."76 While the Court
acknowledged that the literal words of the 1934 statute excluded
"only currency and notes with a maturity of less than nine
71. Sonnenschein, supra note 9, at 1603.
72. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia has stated a
preference for the literal approach since it is the "most consistent with the
language of the statute and Congressional intent and is by far the easiest test
to apply." SEC v. Diversified Industries, 465 F. Supp. 104, 110 (D.D.C. 1979).
73. See supra notes 35-55 and accompanying text.
74. See supra notes 56-72 and accompanying text.
75. While the Court analyzed only the 1934 Act, it recognized the 1933 Act as well
by noting the definitional provisions of both acts are "essentially the same."
102 S. Ct. at 1223 n.3. Although there are some technical differences in the
definitions contained in the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act, e.g., variation in lan-
guage of the two acts relating to oil, gas, and mineral interests; omission in
1934 Act of the term "evidence of indebtedness," both the Senate Report and
the Supreme Court have, prior to Weaver, recognized that the two definitions
are functional equivalents. Techerepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336, 342 (1967)
("virtually identical"); S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1934) ("sub-
stantially the same"). Nevertheless, some commentators have observed that
the differences may present several problems of statutory construction. See,
e.g., Hannan & Thomas, supra note 9, at 221; Sonnenschein supra note 9, at
1573.
76. 102 S. Ct. at 1223.
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months,"77 it nonetheless rejected a literal interpretation of the
Act78 in favor of a more subjective, policy-oriented analysis. This
analysis contained three touchstone reasons for justifying the
Court's conclusion that the Weavers' certificate of deposit was not
a security within the definitional language of the securities laws.
79
First, the Court noted that the statutory language included ordi-
nary stocks and bonds, as well as "countless and variable schemes
devised by those who seek the use of the money of others on the
promise of profits... [including] uncommon and irregular instru-
ments."80 The Court concluded that in order to encompass such
schemes and instruments, the test of a security "is what character
the instrument is given in commerce by the terms of the offer, the
plan of distribution, and the economic inducements held out to the
prospect."81 It may thus be concluded that this character mandate
requires an inquiry into how the instrument is perceived by the
business world rather than how it is labeled by its advocates.
Second, the Court recognized a very important exception to the
statute's definitional language: the provision is prefaced "by the
statement that the terms mentioned are not to be considered se-
curities if 'the context otherwise requires .... " -82 While not elab-
orating on this prefatory language, the Court undoubtedly realized
that, in addition to a character analysis, the special use of this pro-
vision83 warranted a case-by-case investigation into the factual
context surrounding the application of the purported security.
84
77. Id. (emphasis added).
78. See supra notes 66-72 and accompanying text for one circuit's view of the
"literalist approach."
79. See Pitt, supra note 9, at 11, col. 2, for an examination of the Court's three-
part statutory analysis.
It should be recognized that both acts contain the statutory language "cer-
tificate of deposit, for a security." However, the Court acknowledged that the
language does not ostensibly apply to modem high-yield certificates of de-
posit: "Instead, 'certificate of deposit, for a security' refers to instruments is-
sued by protective committees in the course of corporate reorganizations."
102 S. Ct. at 1224, n.5 (quoting Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Fin-
gland, 615 F.2d 465, 468 (7th Cir. 1980)).
80. 102 S. Ct. at 1223 (quoting SEC v. W.J. Howey, Inc., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946));
Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 10 (1971); SEC v.
C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943).
81. Id. (emphasis added) (citing United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. at 24; C.M.
Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. at 352-53).
82. 102 S. Ct. at 1223.
83. The provision, "unless the context otherwise requires," is relatively uncom-
mon in federal statutes. Apart from the federal securities laws, there are only
38 statutory sections of the United States Code that contain the phrase "un-
less the context otherwise requires." See Pitt, supra note 9, at 18, col. 4, n.29.
84. It has been suggested by several commentators that the phrase refers to the
context of the statute, not the circumstances surrounding the instrument.
Hence, the definitions in the statutory language are deemed to govern unless
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Finally, the Court was satisfied in not applying the broad statu-
tory language as a blanket provision simply by virtue of the fact
that "Congress, in enacting securities laws, did not intend to pro-
vide a broad federal remedy for all fraud."85
Thus, it appears the Court has absolved itself of a strict and lit-
eral statutory standard when determining whether the federal se-
curity laws are applicable to any specific instrument. Although the
Court had recognized the "economic realities" element some
fifteen years earlier,8 6 it has still, on occasion, clung to a literalist
approach to statutory analysis in even its most recent securities
law decisions. 87 Nevertheless, it appears that any question as to
whether the literal view is still applicable must be resolved in the
negative in light of the economic realities of the instrument analy-
sis as well as the new, case-by-case character analysis of how an
instrument is perceived within the business community.88 In ad-
the language surrounding the term elsewhere in the act indicates otherwise.
See Loss, supra note 4, at 2485 (Supp. 1969); Hannan & Thomas, supra note 9,
at 278; Comment, supra note 9, at 238-39. See also SEC v. National Securities,
Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969), where the Supreme Court recognized: "Congress it-
self has cautioned that the same words may take on a different coloration in
different sections of the securities laws; both the 1933 and the 1934 Acts
preface their lists of general definitions with the phrase 'unless the context
otherwise requires."' Id. at 466 (emphasis added).
85. Id. at 1223 (emphasis added). The Court, however, did not refer to any legis-
lative history in asserting such congressional intent. Rather, the Court relied
solely on two appellate decisions, Great W. Bank and Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d
1252, 1253 (9th Cir. 1976) and Bellah v. First Nat'l Bank of Hereford, 495 F.2d
1109, 1114 (5th Cir. 1974). In fact, the Court had previously held in Superin-
tendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life and Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971), that section
10(b) and rule l0b-5 "prohibit all fraudulent schemes in connection with the
purchase or sale of securities, whether the artifices employed involve a gar-
den type variety of fraud, or present a unique form of deception .... Novel
or atypical methods should not provide immunity from the security laws."
Id. at 11 n.7 (emphasis in the original). For a discussion of legislative history,
see supra note 31.
86. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967).
87. See, e.g., Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 97 (1981) ('"he search for congres-
sional intent begins with the language of the statute."); Rubin v. United
States, 449 U.S. 424, 429 (1981) ("We begin by looking to the language of the
Act.").
88. But see Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139 (2d Cir. 1982), which was decided
after Weaver. Golden involved a purchase of 100 percent of the outstanding
stock'of a corporation, the plaintiffs subsequently alleging misrepresentation
of the business' value. The court stated that the economic realities test enun-
ciated in Weaver was inapplicable, and that Congress intended to draft an
expansive definition and to include all instruments, even those commercial in
nature. Id. at 1144. See also Chemical Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 552 F.
Supp. 439 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) ('"e Second Circuit [has since Weaver] con-
cluded that an economic reality analysis is inappropriate in most situations
and essentially affirmed the literalist approach to determining whether an
instrument is a security within the meaning of the securities laws.").
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dition, it appears that the Court is content to hold that not all fraud
is covered by the securities laws simply by recognizing that the
acts' definitional provision is qualified by the prefatory expression
"unless the context otherwise requires."
2. The Certificate of Deposit
After fashioning this redefined statutory analysis89 to the secur-
ities laws in the first part of its opinion, the Court was left to apply
the analysis to the certificate of deposit and the business agree-
ment. In respect to the certificate of deposit, the Court concluded
that it should not be treated as a security for two essential reasons.
First, the note differed significantly from other long-term debt obli-
gations in that it "was issued by a federally regulated bank which
is subject to the comprehensive set of regulations governing the
banking industry."90 Second, the purchaser of a bank certificate of
deposit "is virtually guaranteed payment in full, whereas the
holder of an ordinary long-term debt obligation assumes the risk of
the borrower's insolvency."91
The Court's first reason for not finding the certificate of deposit
to fall within the parameters of the securities definitions was based
primarily on the passage of the Glass-Steagall Act,92 established
concurrently with the 1933 and 1934 Acts to regulate the banking
industry and protect depositors.93 Under this federal bank regula-
tory scheme, almost all phases of the business of national, state
member, and insured state nonmember banks are regulated at the
federal level.94 As one commentator has observed:
The regulation of banking may be more intensive than the regulation of
any other industry, and it is the oldest system of economic regulation.
This system may be one of the most successful, if not the most successful.
The regulation extends to all major steps in the establishment and devel-
opment of a national bank, including not only entry into the business,
changes in status, consolidations, and reorganizations, but also the most
89. See supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
90. 102 S. Ct. at 1224.
91. Id. at 1224-25.
92. Banking (Glass-Steagall) Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified at 12
U.S.C. § 227 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)).
93. The Act was designed to closely supervise the financial activity and stability
of banks, see infra note 94, as well as create the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC), see infra note 104. See generally 77 CONG. REc. 3725-31
(1933).
94. Such regulation includes the following:
Entry into the banking industry, 12 U.S.C. §§ 27, 322, 1814 (1976 & Supp. V
1981); reserve requirements, 12 U.S.C. § 461(b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981); report-
ing requirements, 12 U.S.C. §§ 151, 324, 1817 (1976 & Supp. V 1981); inspection
requirements, 12 U.S.C. §§ 481, 483, 1820(b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981); limits on
advertising interest paid on deposits, 12 C.F.R. §§ 217.6, 239.8 (1982). See also
102 S. Ct. at 1224 n.8.
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intensive supervision of operations through regular examination of
banks.95
The Court was undoubtedly influenced greatly by this compre-
hensive regulation. However, an examination of these statutes
reveals some question as to whether there are any individual
rights or remedies available.9 6 It appears the sole purpose of the
banking regulations is to ensure the financial stability of banks as
well as to ensure full and fair disclosure in the financial markets.
The only right to an individual remedy that seems possible is that
right which permits the bank regulatory agencies to rectify any vi-
olation of "law, rule, or regulation" 97 through a cease and desist
order, that may require the bank to "take affirmative action to cor-
rect the conditions resulting from any such violation or practice."98
Whether such "affirmative action" encompasses a benefit to a de-
frauded individual has yet to be addressed by the courts.99
The Court's reliance on the existence of an independent statu-
tory scheme was initially recognized in the Daniel decision,10 0
where the Court held that the existence of ERISA preempted ap-
plication of the securities acts.101 However, in Daniel, the Court's
reliance upon ERISA was only of secondary importance in reach-
ing its result, because the Daniel decision discussed the lack of the
need for application of the federal securities laws only after apply-
ing the Howey formulation to the facts of the case.102 In contrast,
the Court in Weaver treated the existence of the banking regula-
tory scheme as a prime reason for denying federal securities law
coverage to certificates of deposit issued by federally insured
banks without any application of the tests announced in Howey
and its progenies.103
The Court's second and interrelated rationale for not applying
95. K. DAvis, ADmINISTRATIvE LAW TREATISE § 4.04, at 247 (1958) quoted in brief
for the United States as amicus curiae at 11.
96. For example, under 12 U.S.C. § 1818 (1976 & Supp. V 1981), a cease and desist
order may be issued if "unsafe or unsound" practices by a bank are detected.
Id. at § 1818(b) (1). Also, officers may be removed for breaches of fiduciary
duty to the bank where the bank has or probably will suffer "substantial
financial loss," or the interests of depositors generally are "seriously
prejudiced." Id. at § 1818(e).
97. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(1) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
98. Id.
99. Accord, Brief for Myrna Ayala as amicus curiae in support of the respondents
at 15.
100. 439 U.S. 551 (1979). See supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
101. See supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text
102. 439 U.S. at 569-70.
103. 102 S. Ct. at 1224 & n. 7. See also Arnold, supra note 9, at 2203; Pitt, supra note
9, at 11, col. 4. The article by Pitt contends that the ERISA formulation was of
secondary importance because the pension plan at issue in Daniel was not
subject to ERISA.
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the securities laws to the certificate of deposit was the federal
guaranty underlying the note; specifically, the federal deposit in-
surance fund administered by the Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration (FDIC).104 The Court focused on the "virtually
guaranteed payment" by the FDIC should the bank become insol-
vent105 and concluded that the certificate of deposit at issue should
not be treated as a security because it was not subject to the risk of
the borrower's insolvency as would be the case of an ordinary long-
term debt obligation.106 Here again, the problem is that the federal
insurance program provides a guarantee for the depositor only if
the bank should go insolvent, and does not address the issue per-
taining to potential deceptive acts perpetrated by a banking
institution.
One explanation which the Court quickly rebuffed was that the
Weaver certificate of deposit was the functional equivalent of the
withdrawable capital shares of a savings and loan association held
to be securities in Tcherepnin v. Knight.107 The Court flatly re-
jected this conclusion. It held that the withdrawable capital shares
found in Tcherepnin did not pay a fixed rate of return as in the
Weavers' case, but instead paid dividends based on the associa-
tion's profits. In addition, the purchasers in Tcherepnin received
voting rights. The Court concluded that an instrument containing
these two elements found in Tcherepnin more closely evidenced
the "ordinary concept of a security." Consequently, Tcherepnin
was not controlling in a situation such as the Weavers' where the
instrument did not contain either of these features. 08
3. The Profit Sharing Agreement
Having concluded that a certificate of deposit issued by a feder-
ally regulated bank was not a security for purposes of the securi-
104. 102 S. Ct. at 1224. The FDIC's creation and regulatory duties are codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1811-1832 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). To qualify for federal deposit insur-
ance, a bank must satisfy FDIC standards with respect to the use of the
bank's capital structure, financial history, potential for future earnings, and
management. 12 U.S.C. § 1816 (1976). See also supra note 94.
105. 102 S. Ct. at 1224. (citing 1980 ANNuAL REPORT OF THE FDIC 18-21 (1981))
("With respect to the 568 federally insured banks that were closed as of year-
end 1980, 99.9% of the depositors actually received or were assured payment
of their deposits in full . .
106. Id. at 1225.
107. 389 U.S. 332 (1967). Tcherepnin involved withdrawable capital shares in an
Illinois savings and loan association where state law attached the payment of
dividends on the withdrawable shares to an apportionment of profits. Inves-
tors' monies thus represented all of the association's capital, and the certifi-
cate holders could expect a return on their investment only if the savings and
loan association made a profit. Id. at 338-39.
108. 102 S. Ct. at 1224.
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ties laws, it was necessary for the Court to determine whether the
Weavers' claim that their profit sharing agreement with the
slaughterhouse owners constituted a separate security subject to
the anti-fraud provisions of the acts. It was here that the Court
first addressed the Howey test,10 9 citing the lower court's observa-
tion that the agreement fell within the definition of an "investment
contract" to which the Howey test originally applied. 1 0 Acknowl-
edging the Howey test, the Court concluded that the agreement
was not a security because it was "not the type of instrument that
comes to mind when the term security is used .... 111 The Court
reasoned:
The unusual instruments found to constitute securities in prior cases in-
volved offers to a number of potential investors, not a private transaction
as in this case. In Howey, for example, 42 persons purchased interests in a
citrus grove during a four-month period. .. In C.M. Joiner Leasing, of-
fers to sell oil leases were sent to over 1,000 prospects .... In C.M. Joiner
Leasing, we noted that a security is an instrument in which there is "com-
mon trading ..." The instruments involved in C.M. Joiner Leasing and
Howey had equivalent values to most persons and could have been traded
publicly.... Accordingly, we hold that this unique agreement ... is not
a security.
1 12
Thus, it now appears that an instrument or agreement is "not
the type of instrument that comes to mind when the term security
is used" if it does not contain, in addition to the Howey-Foreman-
Daniel elements, a showing that: (1) offers were made to a
number of potential investors, and not offered as part of a private
transaction; (2) the instruments have equivalent values to most
persons; (3) the instrument in question has the ability to be traded
publicly; and (4) the particular instrument contains no significant
features unique to the party alleging the fraud.113
While each of the four refinements have their own peculiar at-
tributes, collectively they appear to be an extension of the "com-
mon enterprise" prong] 4 of the Howey test. This common
enterprise element has recently been addressed by a number of
courts, with two schools of thought emerging from such an exami-
nation. One school of thought emphasizes commonality among in-
vestors and requires "a sharing or pooling of funds" by multiple
investors." 5 This view has been labeled the horizontal ap-
109. See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
110. 102 S. Ct. at 1225.
111. Id.
112. Id. (citations omitted).
113. See also Arnold, supra note 9, at 2203; Pitt, supra note 9, at 18, col. 1.
114. See supra text accompanying note 38.
115. Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96, 99-102 (7th Cir. 1977). See also
Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 887 (1972).
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proach.116 The other, identified as the vertical approach, empha-
sizes the commonality between the promoter and the investor and
only requires a "one-to-one relationship between an investor and
an investment manager."117 After the Weaver decision, it appears
the Supreme Court has inferably adopted the horizontal ap-
proach,1' 8 because such an approach necessarily requires more
than one investor." 9 In any event, the argument advanced by
some courts that a vertical approach may include a single investor
appears to be unequivocally rejected.120 Likewise, when an instru-
ment confers on its holder rights that are not readily comparable
to the rights conferred by any other instrument of the issuer, it
cannot conveniently travel in the public financial markets, and
those markets cannot perform their pricing function in such a
case. 2 1 Under the Weaver rationale, such an instrument cannot
now be afforded the protections of the securities anti-fraud legisla-
tion. Finally, the Court recognizes that an instrument, even if it is
financial, is not a security if it is not "eligible" to be bought and
sold in the public market.122 In the final analysis, it appears that
after Weaver, a "unique, [privately transacted] agreement, negoti-
ated one-on-one by the parties,"123 will no longer be afforded the
protection of the securities laws' anti-fraud provisions.
4. The Court's Caveat
After involving itself in a detailed analysis of both the certifi-
cate of deposit and business agreement, the Court concluded that
"[w] hatever may be the consequences of these transactions, they
did not occur in connection with the purchase or sale of 'securi-
116. See, e.g., 8 FLA. ST. L. REV. 129 (1980).
117. Troyer v. Karcagi, 476 F. Supp. 1142, 1147-48 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
118. Offers must be made to "a number of potential investors .... " 102 S. Ct. at
1225 (emphasis added).
119. However, the Fifth Circuit has opted for the vertical approach, even where a
large number of investors are involved. See SEC v. Continental Commodities
Corp., 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974); SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d
473 (5th Cir. 1974).
120. See, e.g., Troyer v. Karcagi, 476 F. Supp. 1142, 1147 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (link be-
tween any single investor and promoter is "sufficient"); Huberman v.
Denny's Restaurants, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 1249, 1251 (S.D. Colo. 1972) ("immate-
rial that only a single investor involved").
121. For a comprehensive analysis pertaining to the uniqueness of an instrument,
see FitzGibbon, supra note 9, at 929.
122. 102 S. Ct. at 1225. See also FitzGibbon, supra note 9, at 926. This public offer-
ing theory would seem to contradict SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119
(1953), where the Court held that the sale of unissued common stock by a
coporation to "key" employees, and not the general public, nevertheless had
to comply with the registration requirements of the Act.
123. 102 S. Ct. at 1225.
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ties.' "124 However, apparently to avoid 'judicial codification"125 of
its decision regarding all certificates of deposit and profit sharing
agreements, the Court presented a caveat by way of a footnote:
It does not follow that a certificate of deposit or business agreement be-
tween transacting parties invariably falls outside the definition of a secur-
ity as defined by the federal statutes. Each transaction must be analyzed
and evaluated on the basis of the content of the instruments in question,
the purposes intended to be served, and the factual setting as a whole.
1 2 6
In doing so, the Court was undoubtedly persuaded by the argu-
ment, advanced by the SEC acting as anicus curiae, that in other
contexts, such as certificates of deposit issued by nonregulated
banks and money market funds covered under the Investment
Company Act, a different result may be appropriate.127 Such an
evaluation is in accord with the Court's statutory character analy-
sis as set forth in the first part of its decision.128 Nonetheless, as
has been suggested by one writer, the imposition of such a burden
may procure more, rather than less, litigation in the future. 29 Ir-
respective of whether the lower courts take heed to such case-by-
case factual evaluations, it appears that further elaboration from
the Court will be necessary before this issue is settled.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Weaver was correct in deter-
mining that a certificate of deposit was not a security for purposes
of the securities laws and regulations, and indeed, was predictable
in light of previous judicial decisions 30 as well as other more re-
124. Id.
125. For example, the Court recently declined to adopt either of two tests em-
braced by several circuit courts construing previous Supreme Court deci-
sions concerning the scope of the attorney-client privilege: "We are acutely
aware, however, that we sit to decide concrete cases and not abstract proposi-
tions of law. We decline to lay down a broad rule or series of rules to govern
all conceivable future questions in this area, even were we able to do so."
UpJohn Co. v. United States, 101 S. Ct. 677, 681 (1981).
126. 102 S. Ct. at 1225 n.11.
127. Brief for the United States as amicus curiae at 20.
128. See supra notes 75-88 and accompanying text.
129. Pitt, supra note 9, at 18, col. 2.
130. The lower courts generally have held that certificates of deposit issued by
federally regulated banks are not securities. Meason v. Bank of Miami, 652
F.2d 542 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 939 (1982); Bellah v. First Na-
tional Bank of Hereford, 495 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir. 1974); Ayala v. Jamaica Say.
Bank, FED. Sc. L. REP. (CCH) 98041 (E.D.N.Y. June 1, 1981); Hendrickson
v. Buchbinder, 465 F. Supp. 1250 (S.D. Fla. 1979); Hamblett v. Board of Sav-
ings and Loan Ass'ns, 472 F. Supp. 158 (N.D. Miss. 1979); SEC v. Fifth Avenue
Coach Lines, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 3 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). See generally Burrus,
Cootes and Burrus v. MacKethan, 537 F.2d 1262 (4th Cir. 1976), opinion with-
drawn and prior judgment affd on other grounds, 545 F.2d 1388 (4th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 826 (1977).
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cent trends.131 This observation is buttressed by the fact that
while the SEC had long taken the position that bank certificates of
deposit were securities,132 it abruptly abandoned that position af-
ter the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Weaver.133 While the
Weaver conclusion is consistent with the recent trend, the deci-
sion nevertheless departs from some of the Supreme Court's most
prominent and fundamental earlier securities rules in order to
reach that conclusion. One important departure seems to be the
Court's relegation of the Howey test to a secondary position when
other federal remedies and safeguards are available. However,
this type of analysis could conceivably take other instruments, his-
torically considered to be securities, outside the setting of securi-
ties law regulation.1
34
The second departure that may have even greater ramifications
deals with those instruments which are unique, privately negoti-
ated, or unavailable to be traded publicly. The question arises as
to whether an instrument is any less a security because it contains
one of the above elements, even where it otherwise meets all the
Howey-Foreman-Daniel conditions. It appears that while the anti-
fraud provisions of the federal securities laws may still be applica-
ble to "novel, uncommon, or irregular devices," as originally set
out by the Court in 1943,135 it is now questionable whether such
protection will be afforded to an instrument which contains
"unique" features, or is not publicly traded or offered to a number
of potential investors.
131. For example, the American Law Institute has proposed in its Federal Securi-
ties Code a comprehensive definition of "security," including a list of exclu-
sions: "Notwithstanding section 299.53(a), 'security' does not include ... a
bank certificate of deposit that ranks on a parity with an interest in a deposit
account with the bank . . . ." FED. SECURMES CODE § 299.53(b) (5) (Pro-
posed Official Draft 1980).
132. For example, the SEC filed an amicus curiae brief in Safeway Portland Em-
ployees Fed. Credit Union v. Wagner & Co., 501 F.2d 1120 (9th Cir. 1974), argu-
ing that "a CD is an exempt security under the Act." Id. at 1124.
133. Brief for the United States [including the SEC, among other agencies] as
amicus curiae at 6-26, Marine Bank v. Weaver, 102 S. Ct. 1220 (1982).
134. An example would be brokerage firm discretionary accounts, which are al-
ready heavily regulated by either the SEC, the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission, or individual state blue-sky laws. In addition, brokerage firms
are under the jurisdiction of the Securities Investor Protection Corp. (SIPC)
in the event of insolvency, a function similar to that assigned to the FDIC.
Under the Weaver rationale, it would appear unnecessary to subject such dis-
cretionary accounts to liability under the anti-fraud provisions of the federal
securities laws since such accounts are already amply protected. See gener-
ally H. BLOOMENTHAL, 1981 SEcURITIES LAW HANDBOOK 244-48 (1981); LOSS,
supra note 4, at 1479-81; Moreno, Discretionary Accounts, 32 U. MLMI L. REV.
401 (1978); Pitt, supra note 9, at 11, col. 4.
135. SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943).
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Such divergences from the Court's previous securities princi-
ples could conceivably create new ambiguities for lower courts to
deal with when determining whether to apply the federal securi-
ties acts to the specific instruments with which they are presented.
Moreover, Weaver failed to resolve any major potential issues that
have beleaguered the courts since the decision in Howey.136 While
it appears that the Court has rejected the Second Circuit's literal-
ist approach13 7 in favor of a more ad hoc analysis into the charac-
ter of the instrument, much remains to be said as to whether the
commercial-investment dichotomy, risk-capital approach, or
either, constitute a viable and accurate test for determining
whether a certain instrument is a security. It would seem that
while the Court's intent was to limit application of the securities
laws to those types of instruments for which the acts were created
fifty years ago, its decision may in fact allow deceptive parties to
structure an instrument to fall outside the securities laws, when in
fact the securities anti-fraud provisions would be the best method
to deal with such fraudulent schemes. 38 Such a result would un-
doubtedly accomplish little in the way of curtailing superfluous se-
curities litigation, and indeed, may actually initiate more litigation
than would otherwise be necessary to resolve these newly created
ambiguities.
Paul J. Peter '84
136. See, e.g., supra notes 40 & 114-123 and accompanying text.
137. But see supra note 88.
138. An example would be notes issued by a highly speculative investment com-
pany utilizing lax banking regulations in a foreign jurisdiction in order to la-
bel itself a "bank." Such a scheme could arguably come within the purview
of the International Banking Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 611-32 (1976 & Supp. V 1981),
and thus would not be subject to the anti-fraud provisions of the federal se-
curities laws. See generally Korstein, The CD Muddle, 9 SEc. REG. L.J. 395
(1982).
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